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SELF HELP GROUPS AND EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN 
 SELF-SELECTION OR ACTUAL BENEFITS? 
 
Abstract 
Evidence on success of SHGs in empowering females is mixed. In particular, researchers 
argue that such schemes often attract women who are already active in the public domain 
(referred to as ‘self-selection’), so that those who are most in need of assistance remain 
excluded. Simultaneously, the fact that a majority of the SHG members are already 
empowered leads to exaggerated estimates of the effects of the program (called ‘program 
effects’). This paper attempts to test the significance of the program effect of SHGs by 
comparing empowerment levels of newly inducted and older members of SHGs. The 
paper is based on a survey conducted in six municipalities in West Bengal, India. 
 
Keywords: Empowerment, Self Help Groups, Non-parametric tests, Self-selection effect, 
India, Asia. 
 
 
 
1. Intoduction 
Self Help Groups (SHGs) are informal associations consisting of 10-20 members created 
for the purpose of enabling members to reap economic benefit out of mutual help, 
solidarity, and joint responsibility. The group-based approach enables poor women to 
accumulate capital by way of small savings and facilitates their access to formal credit 
facilities (Shylendra, 1998). The concept of joint liability embedded in the SHG enables 
the members to overcome the problem of collateral security, a major barrier to obtaining 
credit from formal institutions. It also leads to peer monitoring, that improves the rate of 
loan recoveries (Stiglitz, 1993). Finally, some of the basic characteristics of SHGs, like 
small size of memberships and homogeneity of composition, bring about cohesiveness 
and effective participation of members in the functioning of the group (Fernandez, 1994). 
 
Although policy makers and NGOs view SHGs as instruments of change and socio-
economic empowerment, the actual evidence on the success of SHGs is mixed. It has 
  
2 
been pointed out that the complex gender relations prevailing within the household and 
the strength of patriarchy within the community determines the ability of SHGs to 
transform the lives of its members (Kabeer, 1998, Rahman, 1999). Another issue that has 
been raised in recent years is that, in order to achieve immediate success and attain 
quantitative targets, women from non-poor households, or those active in the public 
domain, are targeted in such programs. While this results in high rates of attainments, this 
may also artificially inflate success of the program. 
 
In this paper, we address this issue. Based on a study of beneficiaries of the Swarna 
Jayanti Sahari Swarojgar Yojana, an important poverty alleviation scheme for urban slum 
dwellers in India, this paper examines whether the group-based micro-credit program has 
been able to empower women and improve their functional capabilities significantly. In 
particular, we examine the hypothesis that the self-selection mechanism is a major cause 
underlying the apparent success of SHGs in empowering members. That is, we examine 
whether women become empowered after joining SHGs, or whether it is women who are 
already empowered who join SHGs. 
 
The scheme of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on 
SHGs. This is followed by a discussion of methodological issues related to the question 
raised in the paper (Section 3). The findings are discussed in Section 4, followed by a 
concluding section that summarizes the results and discusses their implications. 
 
2. Literature Survey 
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NGOs and policy makers are the greatest advocates of SHGs. Although - relying mainly 
on anecdotal evidence - they have argued that micro-credit programs have empowered 
beneficiaries substantially they have failed to offer any conclusive statistical evidence in 
this regard. While there is a vast body of work in this area, given the complexities in 
defining and measuring empowerment, the evidence in this regard is mixed (Hunt & 
Kasynathan, 2002).  
 
2.1 Positive Outcomes from SHG movement 
Some researchers have observed positive outcomes being generated by participation in 
SHG activities. Mayoux (2000) points out that the use of savings and credit for economic 
activities generates income and assets. This leads to increase in consumption standards 
(Rahman 1986) and, more importantly, reduces vulnerability of poor households by 
reducing smoothening seasonal fluctuations in household income and consumption levels 
(Zaman 2001). The additional income may also act as a safety net by helping the family 
tide over emergencies (ESCAP, 2002). 
 
Participation in SHG movements and access to credit also leads to a change in the status 
of members within their households. It has been observed that the economic contribution 
of women may increase their role in household decision-making (Hashemi et al., 1996, 
Mayoux, 2000, Pitt and Khandker, 1995). This may lead to improved household-level 
outcomes with respect to health, education (particularly education of the girl child, 
nutrition and family planning (Hashemi et al., 1996, Hulme and Mosley, 1997, Kabeer, 
2001, Kumar, 2009; Mayoux, 1997, 1998, 2000).  
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Other positive outcomes of joining SHGS have been observed – greater respect within 
household (FAO, 2002; Mayoux, 2000), increase in mobility, ability to articulate, self-
confidence and esteem (Dollard et al.., 2006; FAO, 2002; Hashemi et al., 1996; 
Krishnaraj and Kay 2002; Putnam 2000), growth of a collective identity (Larence, 2001) 
and political awareness (Hashemi et al., 1996). The incidence of violence against women 
has also been found to have decreased (Hashemi et al., 1996, Schuler et al., 1996).  
 
2.2 Limitations of SHGs 
These optimistic findings about SHGs have been questioned by other researchers. An 
important issue that has been raised by researchers relate to the extent to which women 
are able to retain loans and use them for economic activities (Goetz and Sengupta, 1996, 
Mayoux, 1998). Kabeer (1998) points out that structural, individual and program factors 
are crucial in this respect. It has been argued that patriarchal features of the local 
community and the absence of local investment opportunities limit the extent to which 
women are able to use the loan. As a result they often serve as ‘post boxes’, subsequently 
transferring loans received to their husbands or male relatives. Goetz and Sengupta 
(1996) reported that only about a third of women recipients in Bangladesh were able to 
hold on to their loans; Montogomery and Hulme (1996) found this proportion to be even 
lower among first time borrowers in Bangladesh (only 9%). 
 
Rahman (1999) points out that access to microfinance may increase the vulnerability and 
insecurity of the family. A study by ILO (2004) emphasizes on the considerable social 
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pressure brought upon borrowers to repay their loans. This leads to increased tension to 
within the household (Gibbons, 1999, Goetz and Sengupta, 1996), particularly as women 
often depend on their husbands or male relatives to help in repayment (Matin and Rab, 
1997). This often leads to escalation of domestic violence – a study by Rahman (1999) 
found an increase in violence in 70% of the survey households. 
 
A third problem relates to the allocation of work hours. Since patriarchy demands that 
women complete their household chores, we found during our survey that SHG members 
generally sacrifice their leisure hours to undertake SHG activities in the afternoon and 
evenings. This leads to over-work, fatigue and even malnutrition (Ackerly, 1995).  
 
Another issue, hotly contested by NGO staff and donors, relates to the targeting of 
beneficiaries. Hulme (2000), Kabeer (1998) and Morduch (1998), for instance, found that 
introduction of SHGs in a region did improve income levels, but not of the poorer 
households. The focus on ensuring high repayment rates often leads to the exclusion of 
those households who are perceived as being poor credit risks - the poorest and neediest 
(Hulme and Mosley 1996; Montgomery 1996; Noponan 1990, Krishnaraj and Kay 2002 
and FAO 2002). In fact, in some cases, entry of large organizations has led to the 
squeezing out of smaller organizations with a record of successfully targeting the poorer 
households (Arn and Lily 1992; Ebdon 1994). 
 
A somewhat related issue is that of self-selection. Given that enrolment in SHGs is 
voluntary, self-selection emerges as an important issue. Self-selection occurs when 
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members of a group have a pre-disposition to choose certain outcomes. Since women 
have the choice to join a SHG or not, the movement is more likely to attract women who 
are already economically active, or are more empowered than others. In this case, for 
instance, ‘empowered’ women will join DWCUA members, while those who are not 
‘empowered’ are less likely to join such groups. Comparing empowerment levels in such 
cases will lead to the mistaken conclusion that joining DWCUAs increases empowerment 
levels, when the correct conclusion would have been that empowered women have joined 
DWCUAs. As Steele et al. (1998) point out: 
“Thus, high levels of empowerment among group members cannot be attributed 
to the program alone without controlling for the likelihood of selection bias. 
Clearly, analyses that do not allow for self-selection tend to lead to estimates that 
overstate program impact. Although several studies have attempted to evaluate 
the effects of credit-program participation on reproductive and other behaviors, 
relatively few have addressed the issue of self-selection satisfactorily” (Steele et 
al., 1998: 14). 
This issue forms the focus of our paper. In the next section, we shall discuss how the self-
selection issue has been considered in literature, and how we propose to treat it. 
 
3. Methodological Issues 
The methodological issues - relating to identification of empowerment indicators, choice 
of control group, site selection and statistical tests - are discussed below.  
 
3.1 Indicators of Empowerment 
  
7 
In this paper we try to identify some key factors that increase the ability of the target 
group to make choices and the power to transform these choices into actions and 
outcomes, keeping in mind their unique socio-economic situation. Based upon the survey 
of literature (Section 2.1), we argue that this boils down to five indicators: 
a) Identity of the person controlling income earned from SHG activities: Part of 
the surplus earned from SHG activities is periodically distributed among 
members. If the respondent controls this income then this will provide her with 
some degree of financial autonomy. Her sense of contributing to the family 
(perceived contribution response) increases and her fall-back position will 
improve. This will help her in bargaining for intra-household resources. 
b) Tolerance of domestic violence: Researchers have observed that domestic 
violence may be a common tool employed by husbands to reinforce their 
authority within the domain of the household (Heise et al., 1999). The reluctance 
of women to oppose such violence and tolerate it in silence has also been well 
documented (Bennet and Menderson, 2003). Part of the reason is her poor fall-
back position. Participation in SHGs reduces her tolerance of domestic violence 
not only by empowering her economically but also by increasing her awareness. 
Now an important problem in studying violence against women (VAW) is the 
reluctance of women to report or even discuss such issues. We therefore placed 
some specific contexts before the respondent and asked her whether she felt VAW 
to be justified in each of the cases. 
c) Household decision-making: Increased command over financial resources also 
improves her participation in household decision-making. This may be reflected 
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in a greater say in matters like: daily purchases, major purchases, increased 
mobility (manifested in ability to visit maternal home, relatives and friends, fairs 
and markets), use of contraceptives and her own health seeking behavior. 
d) Improved status within family: As the SHG members augment family income, 
smoothens income and consumption streams and help to tide over crisis, the 
family members acknowledge her contribution by according her greater respect. 
e) Aspirations for the girl child: The process of empowerment leads to a ‘virtuous 
cycle’ with an increase in aspiration, not only for her own self, but also for other 
females in the future generation. Typically, this may be reflected in a desire to 
educate her daughter equally with her sons and allow her to seek gainful 
employment, though within limits. 
Given these indicators of empowerment, the question is how to measure the impact of 
SHGs on empowerment. 
 
3.2 Self-Selection and Choice of Control Group  
As mentioned earlier it is necessary to distinguish between two effects – what may be 
called the program effect (what we want to measure) and what may be called the self-
selection effect (leading to biased over-estimates during evaluation) - in evaluating the 
success of programs based on voluntary participation. The best method for doing so 
would be to use longitudinal data but the cost and time involved is substantial. As a 
result, this method is not practical. In such cases, a quasi-experimental panel design may 
be used to incorporating ‘before and after’ information as in Amin et al. (1995), Schuler 
and Hashemi (1994), Steele et al.. (1998) and Rahman and DaVanzo (1997). Since the 
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survey is undertaken after the program introduction, the ‘before’ information is based on 
recall. Unless the time interval is short, a recall bias may occur. Finally, two-stage models 
may be used to control for self-selection bias (Maddala, 1983) as in Pitt et al. (1995) to 
evaluate the effect of three group-based credit programs on current contraceptive use and 
fertility in Bangladesh. The problem with the two-stage model approach is that it requires 
restrictions that are hard to satisfy.  
 
In this paper, we have controlled for self-selection by collecting information on when the 
respondent joined the SHG. This information was used to divide respondents into two 
groups – newly inducted members (those who had joined SHGs within six months) and 
‘older’ members. If we assume that only the program effect operates, then newly 
inducted members should either not be empowered, or have lower levels of 
empowerment, while older members are empowered. On the other hand, if self-selection 
is present, then the empowerment levels of both groups will not differ substantially. The 
problem then becomes of measuring empowerment levels of newly inducted and older 
DWCUA members and testing to see whether there is a significant difference in their 
empowerment levels. This method has the advantage that it avoids the issue of recall. 
 
3.3 Selection of Survey Sites 
The findings of this paper are based on six municipalities - Kaliagunj (Uttar Dinajpur), 
Old Maldah (Maldah), Barrackpore (North 24 Parganas), Chandannagar (Hooghly), 
Burdwan (Burdwan) and Gayeshpur (Nadia). The specific municipalities were suggested 
by the State Urban Development Agency (SUDA), the agency implementing the scheme 
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at the state-level, on the grounds that the process of forming DWCUAs was particularly 
successful in these municipalities. Discussion with officials (both of SUDA and 
municipalities) revealed that the main parameters for considering SHG groups to be 
successful were stable membership, ability of members to repay loans taken from the 
revolving fund, ability of the group to repay the subsidized bank loan and generation of a 
steady surplus from SHG activities.  
Table 1: Statistics Relating to ULBs Surveyed 
Some important statistics relating to the survey sites are given in Table 1. We should also 
note differences in the economic characteristics of the municipalities. Three of the sites 
have strong links to the agricultural sector – of which Burdwan is located in a developed 
and prosperous agricultural hinterland, while Kaliagunj and Old Maldah are agro-based 
but underdeveloped towns. Barrackpore and Gayeshpur are industrial towns. Barrackpore 
was once an important industrial area; over time the decline of the jute industry has 
eroded its economic importance. However, its proximity to the metropolitan city of 
Kolkata and its well developed educational infrastructure has resulted in a relatively 
educated population. Gayeshpur, on the other hand, is a satellite of the industrial 
township of Kalyani. It is relatively under-developed. However, the success of some 
specific SHGs led us to study select this site. The last site, Chandannagar, was originally 
a French colony, set up in 1784. The proximity of Chandannagar to Kolkata and the 
transport links between the two cities has resulted in the growth of the service sector in 
this town. 
 
3.4 Statistical Method 
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Based on the indicators of empowerment discussed earlier we have constructed ‘scores’ 
of empowerment, corresponding to aspects like decision-making power, tolerance for 
domestic violence, and so on. The scoring method is discussed below: 
1. Control over respondents’ income: If respondent herself decides, a score of 1 is 
assigned; in case of joint control she is assigned a score of 0.5 and 0 if she does 
not have any control over income earned from SHG activities. 
2. Household Decision-making power: Respondent as sole decision-maker is 
coded as 1, joint decision-making as 0.5 and all other cases as 0.  
Issues considered were: Who spends husbands’ income? Who decides on 
treatment of respondent? Who decides on major household purchases? Who 
decides on daily purchases? Who decides whether respondent may visit her 
maternal home? Who decides whether respondent may visit other relatives? Who 
decides whether respondent may go to distant fairs or markets? Who decides the 
vote of respondent? Who decides whether to use contraceptives? 
Individual scores for each component were aggregated to form the composite 
score for this indicator. 
3. Opposition to domestic violence: Coded as 1 if respondent did not support 
violence and as 0 if she felt that violence was justified in the specific context.1 If 
respondent was uncertain, this was coded as 0.5. The contexts are given below:  
a. Wife leaves home without permission 
b. Wife does not look after child properly 
c. Wife does not cook properly  
d. Wife argues with husband 
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e. Wife refuse to have sexual relations with husband 
f. Husband suspects that wife has illicit relations 
g. Wife does not behave properly with in-laws 
4. Improvement in status within household: If respondent reported that she was 
accorded increased respect, she was assigned a score of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
5. Aspiration for girl child: Responses to whether respondent wanted daughters to 
be educated equally with sons, whether daughters would be allowed to work, and 
whether they would be allowed to work in local retail shops were coded as 1 if her 
response was affirmative and 0 if negative. 
 
The mean and median scores for each of these aggregate indicators are estimated for new 
and old members respectively. We then test whether differences between these scores 
differ between the sub-groups. The choice of appropriate statistical method becomes an 
important issue here. Given the size of both sub-samples (45 new members and 195 old 
members), t-tests based on the assumption of a normal distribution may be applied. In 
addition, we have also employed two non-parametric tests – the Mann-Whitney and 
Kruskall-Wallis tests. These methods have the added advantage that, while t-tests may be 
influenced by the ad hoc values of scores assigned, such considerations are irrelevant in 
rank based tests. 
 
This method, however, has a problem that it fails to control for socio-economic factors. 
We therefore follow up the two sample tests with a set of limited dependant regressions. 
Each of the empowerment indicators are regressed upon socio-economic variables that 
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are likely to influence empowerment levels (per capita income, household size, religion, 
caste, education of respondent and husband) and a dummy to distinguish between newly 
inducted and older members. If the coefficient of this dummy variable is insignificant, 
then the program effect can be ruled out. 
 
4. Findings  
Our survey revealed that SHG members were involved in undertaking activities like 
selling garments, handicrafts, trading in rice, embroidery, tailoring, dairy farming, spice 
making, and other activities. Such activities yielded in a substantial income – consisting 
of about a fifth of household income. However, such activities were not uncommon 
before the introduction of the program in the survey sites. We found that 60% of 
respondents had been engaged in economic activities before joining DWCUAs, though 
on a part time individual basis. The achievement of SHGs was that it injected capital into 
the system, mobilized individual activities into group-based activity, and intensified 
participation in economic activities. While this reduced any potential source of conflict, 
the absence of any structural break may have also resulted in the program generating only 
economic effects, without creating a capacity to transform the social life of the 
community. 
 
4.1 Levels of Empowerment 
Our survey revealed that almost half of the respondents decide on how to spend their own 
income, while about 30% make this decision jointly with their husbands. This would 
imply that 80% of respondents have at least some control over their income, which is 
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very encouraging. Proportion of respondents with control over family income, 
expectedly, is lower - 60% of respondents reported that that they had some control over 
their husband’s income.  
 
It can be seen that less than a third of respondents have sole control over household 
decisions like health-care seeking behaviour, major purchases, visiting maternal home, or 
relatives, and going to distant fairs (Table 2). Control of respondents is markedly lacking 
with respect to family planning issues like contraceptive use – only one out of ten 
respondents exercise this decision on their own. In roughly 30-40% cases, the husband 
takes these decisions himself. The only exceptions are with respect to exercise of 
electoral rights and daily purchases. Further, if we compare the figures for our entire 
sample and the sub-group who are married and live with their husbands, it may be seen 
that an even smaller proportion of respondents have full control over decisions in most 
cases. 
Table 2: Identity of decision-maker in household decisions  
While it may be argued that the adoption of birth control measures is a decision that 
should be taken jointly,2 the limited autonomy of women in most of the other decision-
making spheres challenges the popular notion that engagement in market activities will 
enhance the ability to influence household outcomes. In particular, the inability to take 
mobility-related decisions (visiting maternal home, relatives, fairs) and health care 
decisions should be a matter of concern for policy makers.  
 
Of course, the large proportion of respondents with some say in decisions may be taken 
as an indicator of change – while previously, the respondents might not have had any say, 
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now they may have at least some say. Given the absence of information on the change in 
decision-making power, however, this hypothesis cannot be tested. 
 
It can be seen that the tolerance of respondents vary widely with respect to the specific 
context of violence. Respondents feel that beating of wives is justified if women do not 
behave properly with their in-laws (40%), if women have illicit relations (35%), if 
women argue with their husbands (28%), if women do not cook properly and if women 
do not look after their children (21%) (Table 3). This is interesting as all these situations 
involve norms of the patriarchal family, where the women have the responsibility to 
provide care services to family members. A surprisingly large proportion of respondents 
do not support violence if the wife refuses to have sexual relations. This attitude is 
justified by respondents on the grounds that a refusal to have intercourse with the 
husband is not a ‘normal practice’ and may be due to a sexual problem with the husband. 
Table 3: Tolerance of domestic violence in specific contexts 
About 75% of respondents reported that they were treated with greater respect and 
accorded more importance by their household members after joining DWCUAs. 
Appreciation of the fact that respondents were contributing to household welfare was the 
most common reason for increase in status within the households (69%). Another 
important reason was increase in self-respect of respondents (14%).3 
 
The survey also found that a substantial majority of respondents wanted to educate their 
daughters as much as their sons (90% of respondents), and wanted their daughters to 
work (86%). However, there were restrictions on the place of work. When the question 
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“Will you allow your daughter to work?” was rephrased as “Will you allow your 
daughter to work in a shop?”, the proportion of respondents expressing reluctance 
increased sharply from 10% to 48%.  
 
The analysis of motives for educating daughters revealed that the desire to ensure 
economic independence (cited in 38% cases) dominates other motives, followed by the 
desire to ensure self-respect (21%), improve marriage prospect (13%) and ability to 
educate her child (12%). While the first two may be identified to be positively correlated 
with empowerment, the substantial presence of the latter two motives would indicate the 
persistence of traditional patriarchal values. 
 
Now this discussion does not distinguish between the self-selection and program effect. 
In the next section, therefore, we turn to this issue and try to nullify the self-selection 
effect.  
 
4.2 Is Selection Mechanism at Work? 
As discussed in Section 3, one way of doing so is to compare empowerment scores 
between old and new SHG members. Table 4 reports the results of this comparison. It can 
be seen that such differences are significant only in two cases – opposition to domestic 
violence and improvement in status within household. The results are similar for all the 
three tests. 
Table 4: Differences in Empowerment Indicators between Old and New Members 
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4.3 A Disaggregative Analysis 
Since the household decision-making and tolerance for domestic violence are based on 
aggregation of individual scores, it is necessary to analyse these two indicators carefully. 
Therefore, the method used above is applied on the individual components that make up 
these two scores. 
 
In the case of household decision-making differences between scores are statistically 
insignificant in all cases (Table 5). This is consistent with the finding that differences in 
the aggregate score for empowerment between old and new DWCUAs were statistically 
insignificant. 
Table 5: Differences in Decision-making between Old and New Members 
It can be seen (Table 6) that there is a significant difference in tolerance towards 
domestic violence only in the contexts of wife not cooking properly, or not caring for her 
child, or arguing with her husband. At the 10% level, difference in scores in the case of 
“wife does not behave properly with in-laws” is also statistically significant. This may 
indicate that older members appreciate the fact that their involvement in economic 
activities may affect household tasks, like child care and cooking, and has to be accepted 
as an inevitable cost of their efforts to augment family income. The greater perceived 
contribution to the household may also have encouraged them to challenge the authority 
of the husband and argue with him.  
Table 6: Differences in Opposition to Violence between Old and New Members  
 
4.4 Regression Analysis 
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The results do not show any substantial program effects. This is further confirmed if we 
control for socio-economic and personal factors.  
 
It can be seen (Table 7) that the coefficient of the dummy variable for members with 
more than six months experience is significant only in the regressions for ‘Improved 
status of respondents’ and – at a 10% level of significance - “Opposition to domestic 
violence’. This implies that, although women are empowered to some extent in the study 
sites, this cannot be attributed to the program effect. Their earlier history of participation 
in part-time economic activities had possibly empowered a large proportion of the 
respondents; as a result, when the SHG movement started in these areas, these members 
joined readily. The possibility that these members may have been (consciously or 
unconsciously) pre-selected by municipality officials and councilors during the process of 
identifying possible SHG members also cannot be ruled out.  
Table 7: Summary of Regression Results 
Our survey revealed that the increase in status of respondents is attributed mainly to 
recognition of their contribution to family income. The income from SHG activities is 
substantial, and comprises a fifth of household income on average. More important than 
the quantitative contribution, is how this income is used. Given that more than a third of 
respondents were exposed to sharp seasonal fluctuations in income (and hence 
consumption), a major contribution of income from SHG activities was to smoothen such 
income and consumptions fluctuations. It was also reported that this income had an 
important role in reducing drop outs from schooling due to an inability to pay session 
fees, and purchase books and stationery at the start of the academic session.  
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The other mechanism underlying an improvement in status within household is the 
increase in self-respect that participation in SHG activities breeds. Discussion with 
respondents revealed that interaction with other women, undertaking economic 
transactions (when buying inputs or selling products), visiting local markets and 
interacting with municipality officials in the Poverty Eradication Cell were the main 
channels through which their self-respect and confidence was enhanced. These factors are 
also important in increasing the ability to protest against domestic violence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up, the emphasis on ensuring the success of the group and attain targets set for 
the formation of SHGs may have led municipality officials to target women who are 
more likely to repay loans, or those who already participate in economic activities and are 
empowered to some extent. This creates difficulties in assessing the success of such 
schemes. This problem has been observed by other researchers on SHGs who have tried 
to disentangle the self-selection and program effects while evaluating SHG programs 
using alternative methods. In this paper we compare between empowerment levels of 
newly inducted and older members and test for differences in their empowerment levels 
using non-parametric methods. This is followed by an econometric analysis where socio-
economic variables are additionally incorporated as control variables while continuing to 
test for this difference. This method has the advantage that it avoids the problem of recall 
and is less time consuming and cost effective. However, one type of self-selection 
problem remains. Since we are undertaking a mid-point evaluation of the scheme, we 
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cannot rule out the possibility that already empowered women join at the start of the 
program, while less empowered women or those not empowered at all join gradually. 
However, this has been tackled to some extent by undertaking surveys at multiple sites 
where the program has been introduced at different time points.  
 
Our results indicate that program effects operated only to reduce tolerance of domestic 
violence and enhance status of members within the household. While these are important 
gains, the overall failure of the SHGs to empower women needs consideration. We had 
noted earlier that the scheme had not introduced any new form of activity but had simply 
enabled economic activities previously undertaken on an individual and part-time basis to 
be undertaken with greater labour and capital resources on a systematic basis. Thus, 
instead of creating structural breaks, SHGs, more often than not, simply elevated the 
intensity of traditional part-time economic activities. This was acceptable to men for two 
reasons - income from such activity supplemented their meager family income and acted 
as a buffer during seasonal crisis, and such activities were undertaken in the afternoon 
and evenings so that they involved a diversion of leisure time and did not affect 
household chores. Any empowerment that challenged patriarchal structures was viewed 
as a necessary cost that was more than offset by the considerable economic gains from 
involvement in SHGs. This had the effect of reducing potential sources of conflict with a 
patriarchal community. On one hand, it facilitated the attainment of targets for number of 
SHGs established; on the other hand, it ensured success of groups in terms of the 
economic parameters used by officials to measure success. The failure to challenge 
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traditional social structures and disengagement with the process of setting up of SHGs, 
however, remains a hurdle to a broader level of empowerment for the women involved. 
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END NOTES 
1
 As a matter of fact, it should be intolerance of domestic violence. However, tolerance makes easy reading. 
2
 We found that 70% of relevant respondents decided on adopting birth control measures jointly. Note that 
we simply asked whether the decision to adopt family planning was taken by respondent, her husband or 
jointly – we did not probe about precise method used as the women were reluctant to reveal such details. 
3
 This may be similar to what is called perceived interest response. The increase in self respect of 
respondents makes them feel that their welfare should also be considered when allocating resources to 
maximize household welfare. 
 1 
Table 1: Statistics Relating to ULBs Surveyed 
Urban Local 
Body 
District No. of 
Slums 
Year of 
Establishment 
Area 
(Sq km) 
Total 
Population 
Slum 
Population 
Slum 
Population 
as %age of 
Total 
Population 
Female 
Slum 
Population 
Females as 
%age of 
Slum 
Population 
Below 
Poverty 
Line (BPL)  
Population 
BPL 
Persons 
as %age 
of Total 
Populati
on 
Barrackpore North 24 
Paraganas 
37 1916 11.65 144411 4459 3.1 2593 58.2 17535 12.1 
Burdwan Burdwan 34 1865 48 285871 59719 20.9 29935 50.1 70064 24.5 
Chandannagar Hooghly 41 1955 20 162166 42894 26.5 20020 46.7 22417 13.8 
Gayeshpur Nadia 18 1995 23 55028 14283 26.0 6844 47.9 17239 31.3 
Kaliaganj Uttar 
Dinajpur 
17 1987 8.99 47639 15600 32.7 14965 - 23789 49.9 
Old Maldah Maldah 38 1869 9.58 62944 41880 66.5 3439 - 32441 51.5 
Sources: State Urban Development Agency, communication dated 15 October 2009.Figures for Kaliagunj and Old Maldah obtained from TPO. 
West Bengal Municipal Development Authority Webpage.  
General Statistics: http://wbdma.gov.in/htm/Ma_4_2_muni%20Catagory_Tab-2.htm; 
Slum Population. http://wbdma.gov.in/htm/Total%20Number%20of%20Slum.htm  
"Census of India 2001: Data from the 2001 Census, including cities, villages and towns (Provisional)". Census Commission of India. Archived 
from http://web.archive.org/web/20040616075334/http://www.censusindia.net/results/town.php?stad=A&state5=999; accessed on 2004-06-1. 
 2 
Table 2: Identity of decision-maker in household decisions  
Decisions Respondent Joint Husband 
 Respondent's treatment 20.9 35.3 43.8 
 Major household purchase 16.8 46.2 37.1 
 Daily household purchase 44.8 23.4 31.8 
 Visit to maternal home 23.1 34.9 42.1 
 Visiting relatives' house 22.2 38.4 39.4 
 Whom to vote for 65.8 14.6 19.6 
 Use of contraceptives 10.0 69.5 20.5 
 Going to distant fair and markets 15.4 43.4 41.1 
 
 
Table 3: Tolerance of domestic violence in specific contexts 
Situation(Context) Tolerant Uncertain  Does not Support 
Wife leaves home without permission  13.3 6.3 80.4 
Wife does not look after child properly 20.8 7.5 71.7 
Wife does not cook properly 21.7 8.3 70.0 
Wife argues with husband 27.9 10.0 62.1 
Refuses to have sexual relations 14.2 17.9 67.9 
Husband suspects that wife has illicit 
relations 
34.6 9.2 56.3 
Wife does not behave properly with in-
laws 
40.4 7.1 52.5 
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Table 4: Differences in Empowerment Indicators between Old and New Members 
Mean Median Scores 
New Old New Old 
t value Mann 
Whitney 
U 
Kruskall 
Walls H 
Control over respondent's income 1.79 1.92 1.000 0.500 -0.487   2062.0   0.904 
Household Decisions 6.071 4.819 6.50 5.00 1.435     330.5                              1.804
Opposition to domestic violence 4.133 5.026 4.00 6.00 -2.55** 3097** 9.9** 
Improvement in status of member 0.65 0.86 1.00 1.00 -2.99** 2263** 8.65** 
Aspiration for girl children 2.222 2.405 2.00 3.00 -1.448  3780.5   2.574 
Note:  Levene’s test has been used to test for equality of variances. Based on the results, the appropriate 
t-statistic has been calculated. 
 Statistics significant at 5% and 10% level have been indicated by asterisks (** and *, 
respectively). 
 
Table 5: Differences in Decision-making between Old and New Members 
Mean Median Decision 
New Old New Old 
t value U H 
Control of family income 0.387 0.373 0.500 0.500 0.211 2469.5 0.01 
Respondent's treatment 0.455 0.405 0.500 0.500 0.727 4003 0.474 
Major household purchase 0.44 0.396 0.500 0.500 0.689 3797 0.403 
Daily household purchase 0.605 0.549 1.000 0.500 0.742 3861 0.679 
Visit to maternal home 0.474 0.439 0.500 0.500 0.479 3111.5 0.188 
Visiting relative's house 0.488 0.437 0.500 0.500 0.724 3674 0.434 
Whom to vote for 0.702 0.77 1.000 1.000 -1.008 3714.5 0.857 
Use of contraceptives 0.379 0.462 0.500 0.500 -1.600 2216.5 2.589 
Going to distant fair and markets 0.412 0.417 0.500 0.500 -0.073 2932.5 0.02 
 4 
Table 6: Differences in Opposition to Violence between Old and New Members  
Mean Median Context 
New Old New Old 
t value U H 
Wife leaves home without 
permission  
0.778 0.849 1.00 1.00 -1.12 4009 1.703 
Wife does not look after child 
properly 
0.622 0.769 1.00 1.00 -2.16** 3565.5** 5.933** 
Wife does not cook properly 0.644 0.779 1.00 1.00 -2.01** 3609.5** 5.518** 
Wife argues with husband 0.533 0.703 0.50 1.00 -2.33** 3458** 6.643** 
Refuses to have sexual relations 0.722 0.779 1.00 1.00 -0.947 3867.5 2.263 
Husband suspects that wife has 
illicit relations 
0.522 0.628 0.50 1.00 -1.381 3816.5 2.372 
Wife does not behave properly 
with in-laws 
0.444 0.587 0.50 1.00 -1.92* 3667.5* 3.729* 
Statistics significant at 5% and 10% level have been indicated by asterisks (** and *, respectively). 
 5 
Table 7: Summary of Regression Results 
Empowerment 
Indicators  
Control over 
SHG income 
Household 
decisions 
Opposition 
to VAW 
Improved 
status 
Aspirations 
Method Ordered 
logit 
OLS 
Regression 
OLS 
Regression 
Binomial 
Logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Control Variables 
Religion  Positive** Positive** Positive** Positive** 
Caste      
Household 
size 
Negative*   Positive*  
Income    Positive**  
Age  Positive*    
Education of 
respondent 
     
Education of 
husband 
Positive** Positive**   Positive* 
Dummy for 
Old Member 
  Positive* Positive**  
R2 (pseudo) 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.04 
F or χ2 26.88** 4.17** 2.04** 22.98** 16.76** 
Note: Significance of coefficient at 5% level and 10% level are denoted by ** and *, respectively.  
 
